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Despite very substantial investments in anti-corruption, 
progress is frustratingly limited and in some cases 
insignificant. The resources devoted to the issue in the last 
fifteen years have been sizable, stemming from intense 
activity on the part of multilateral organisations, bilateral 
donors and private companies across numerous countries. 
These efforts have focused for the most part on ensuring 
the implementation of the OECD and UN conventions as 
well as regional instruments, building capacity, providing 
technical assistance and offering educational programs – 
to the point one can speak of the emergence of a veritable 
“anti-corruption industry”. Given that the anti-corruption 
agenda is frequently and correctly linked to those of rule 
of law, good governance and sustainable development, 
the funds and human capital applied to this issue are even 
more significant.
Against this background, one would expect to find measurable 
progress, reflected in an important reduction in the levels of 
corrupt activity around the world. Yet, in reality the results 
are deeply disappointing: Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index scores for sub-Saharan 
African countries, where many projects have focused, have 
worsened since the start of the “anti-corruption eruption”. 
Global Integrity reports tell us that even when laws and 
reforms are introduced, their implementation is inadequate. 
Furthermore, in many countries anti-corruption laws are 
weakly or inconsistently implemented, sometimes even 
used as an instrument to target political opponents or simply 
applied only in cases of minor offenses involving low-level 
officials, leaving grand corruption crimes unpunished. 
The lack of effectiveness of conventional anti-corruption 
interventions is thus quite clear (Mungiu-Pippidi 2011, 
2015) and is reflected in the implementation gap, whereby 
countries that have committed themselves to legal and 
organizational reforms as well as the implementation of 
anti-corruption best practices continue to experience 
very high levels of corruption. Mungiu-Pippidi (2011) has 
also noted the paradox of how scores on the control of 
corruption keep worsening, even as the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption gets ratified and specialized 
anti-corruption authorities are instituted by an increasing 
number of countries. Especially worrisome is how this lack 
of progress is also being reflected in the mood of people 
globally, as disappointment and demoralization lead to 
declines in institutional legitimacy (from the trust in the 
EU and national governments to particular politicians and 
the media) and consequently resulting in fertile grounds 
for populist politicians, who promise dramatic (though not 
necessarily realistic or desirable) changes to the political 
and economic systems to break the cycle of corruption 
(Heinrich and Transparency International 2017).
The lack of progress demands that we conscientiously 
rethink the way in which we formulate our anti-corruption 
approaches. In this paper, we make the argument that a 
new generation of more effective anti-corruption strategies 
can only be adequately developed through an evidence 
based understanding of the actual conditions prevailing 
in the countries where we want to support the fight 
against corruption. This involves delving into the context-
specific factors that account for the observed high levels 
of corruption as well as for the lack of effectiveness of 
mainstream approaches. 
1. What is the problem?
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The arguments presented above indicate that we need to 
collect empirical evidence to better understand those cases 
notoriously characterised by the persistence of widespread 
corruption. The argument is that we need to take a closer 
look at how things actually happen, independently of how we 
would expect state institutions to perform according to good 
governance logic. Relevant questions include, therefore: 
How are decisions made across the public sector and by 
whom? What are the context-dependent considerations that 
shape the choices and behaviours of key national actors? 
How is corruption understood and experienced by average 
citizens? 
In this section we discuss emerging findings from two 
on-going research projects of the Basel Institute’s Public 
Governance Division.1 Adopting an inductive approach, 
this research has aimed to identify those practices and 
norms that are effective in “getting things done” (e.g. 
solving problems, attaining desired outcomes) and are thus 
commonly employed by local actors and stakeholders top-
down (on the part of political and business elites) as well 
as bottom-up (on the part of citizens).2 In doing so, we 
have uncovered unwritten rules and behavioural patterns 
that articulate informal governance regimes, which are 
1 The first project, entitled “Informal Governance and Corruption - 
Transcending the Principal-Agent and Collective Action Paradigms” 
is funded by the joint UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) and British Academy Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Pro-
gramme. For more information about the ACE programme and the 
project please visit http://www.britac.ac.uk/anti-corruption and 
http://www.britac.ac.uk/node/4660 The second project is en-
titled “Corruption, Social Norms and Behaviours in East Africa” 
and is funded by the East Africa Research Fund of DFID. For more 
information about the EARF and the project please visit http://
www.earesearchfund.org/ and http://www.earesearchfund.org/
research-corruption-social-norms-and-behaviors-east-africa
2 Informal practices that are socially prevalent and entrenched abound 
around the world as documented by the vast database compiled by the 
Global Informality Project (http://in-formality.com/). Understanding of 
their varied impacts on development outcomes remains a key consider-
ation in guiding future research.
associated with a high prevalence of corruption.
The evidence coming out of the research suggests that 
there are at least two areas that formal anti-corruption 
strategies do not address and which are critical to develop 
more effective approaches, namely uncovering hidden 
agendas and tackling the habits of corruption.
2.1 Informal governance 
practices among elites
The arguments about top-down informal governance practices 
stem from research based on a comparative design involving 
seven countries from East Africa and Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. The sample includes five “challenging” cases 
– Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Tanzania and Uganda – 
where corruption remains endemic despite the introduction 
of adequate laws and institutional arrangements. The other 
two countries – Georgia and Rwanda – represent success 
stories, where control of corruption has recorded significant 
success.3
We have identified three distinct patterns of informal 
governance practices that are associated with high levels 
of corruption (Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva 2017):
• Co-optation is associated with recruitment or strategic 
appointments into public office of allies and potential 
adversaries, who are granted impunity in exploiting 
the power and resources associated to public office in 
exchange of mobilizing support and maintaining loyalty 
to the regime.4
• Control mechanisms are instrumental to manage clashes 
of hidden interests, ensure elite cohesion and enforce 
discipline of allies, which is why the unwritten rules of 
3 The cases of Georgia and Rwanda are discussed below in section 2.3.
4 See Carter for an illustration of how co-optation practices find their 
equivalent in the West as well (1997).
2. What does the evidence tell 
us?
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co-optation depend on the existence of such informal 
control practices. Common examples involve the 
selective enforcement of anti-corruption laws against 
opponents or renegades, underscoring the validity of 
the saying attributed to Brazilian dictator Getulio Vargas: 
“for my friends everything and for my enemies the law”.5 
• Camouflage refers to the manner in which the realities of 
political co-optation and control are hidden underneath 
institutional façades and policies consistent with a 
commitment to good governance and democratic 
accountability. Thus, punishment of a detractor may be 
accompanied by proclamations on the commitment to 
anti-corruption.6
The emerging evidence shows that informal practices in the 
challenging cases are pervasive; decisively shaping the in
5 See also Moroff and Schmidt-Pfister, 2010; for similar practices in cas-
es of organized crime (Smith, 1990).
6 Studies of scandals and how they only scratched the surface are consis-
tent also with the camouflage pattern (Neckel, 1989; Passas, 1996) or 
even the TV series “Yes Minister”.
teractions among power networks of political and business 
elites and influencing how state actors relate to the general 
public. Numerous examples illustrate how these “three C’s” 
are resorted to by political elites in authoritarian regimes 
to informally redistribute access to public resources along 
particularistic criteria, favouring networks of regime “insiders” 
at the expense of “outsiders”. In fact, in the challenging 
cases, informal practices can be best characterised as 
instruments of governance associated with regime survival 
because they promote elite cohesion, nurture bases of 
support and weaken opponents. 
These general findings can be illustrated in relation to the 
electoral process, whereby informal practices are utilised 
to secure favourable election outcomes through several 
routes as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Informality, elections and corruption
Source: Authors
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First, informal governance mobilises political support and 
ensures elite cohesion by means of the selective distribution 
of goods, money and access to rents to supporters. 
Secondly, informal controls work to intimidate and obstruct 
the activities of opposition forces, for example through 
mobilisation of co-opted networks in the law enforcement 
sector or camouflaged via the selective application of laws 
related to national security. 
Informal governance practices are also often utilised 
to mobilise co-opted members of informal networks in 
order to secure the financial resources that are needed 
to fund electoral campaigns, but also to buy votes and 
other activities geared at securing favourable outcomes. 
A common pattern involves collusion with influential co-
opted business interests that provide financial resources 
to political elites during elections in exchange for privileged 
financial rewards such as large government contracts and 
informal tax exemptions. Also, several grand corruption 
scandals -such as the Richmond scandal in Tanzania and 
the Goldberg scandal in Kenya- have been associated with 
the intention to divert large sums for electoral purposes. 
All in all, the emerging evidence strongly suggests that in 
competitive authoritarian regimes informal practices around 
elections are frequently employed and are associated not 
only to political corruption but also to economic crimes. 
Overall, we find that the gap between the formal rules of 
democratic governance and commitment to anti-corruption 
and the actual informal practices of authoritarian survival via 
electoral manipulation and particularistic re-distribution of 
public resources is enormous.  Furthermore, it appears in 
fact that discrepancy between the formal and the informal 
is a key factor enabling the corrupt to hide their deeds deep 
under the camouflage of the legal order.
These findings force a reflection on how informal governance 
compromises the effectiveness of the legal instruments 
typically involved in the fight against corruption. If corruption 
is indeed associated to the strategies of regime survival, 
then it follows that the enforcement of the anti-corruption 
framework is impracticable from the perspective of 
entrenched authoritarian elites as it entails undermining 
their bases of support. 
2.2 Community norms and the 
social acceptability of corruption 
From the bottom-up, our research at the grassroots level 
seeks to uncover the factors that influence attitudes towards 
petty corruption among citizens in Tanzania and Uganda 
– where petty corruption is widespread – as well as in 
Rwanda, where petty corruption has been for the most part 
effectively eradicated.7 Overall, the research points to the 
role that social norms and understandings play in fuelling 
and perpetuating positive attitudes towards corruption. 
Just as the top-down analysis indicates that informal 
governance responds to the interests of networks of political 
and business elites, the research at the community level 
in Tanzania and Uganda reveals the salience of informal 
social networks as valued problem-solving resources for 
citizens. Informal social networks provide group solidarity 
and pooling of resources benefitting the group members and 
helping people cope with the difficulties of life generally, but 
also with deficient public service provision and widespread 
corruption in state institutions. 
Research participants have described how typically any 
individual may be part of multiple networks. In a first instance 
there are the networks comprising family and friends. At 
a next level come the networks that include more distant 
acquaintances such as school peers, colleagues and 
neighbors. However, networks may also be very fluid and 
constructed instrumentally which means they can include 
individuals even more far removed from each other. As one 
commentator remarked, “when you have a problem and you 
do not have people to help you with it, then you go ahead 
and build the network to the person who can help you”.  
7 The case of Rwanda is discussed below in section 2.3.
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What makes such informal social networks relevant to our 
research is that they generate strong moral imperatives, 
including a sense of obligation to provide mutual assistance 
and reciprocity for favours given, which go above and beyond 
any consideration for the formal legal framework. This may 
very well be the strongest social norm found in the research 
so far. 
Especially noteworthy is that the obligations vis-à-vis the 
network cut across the public/private divide, which means 
that in practice the networks hold strong expectations that 
any member who has a position in the public sector has the 
duty to utilize that position for the benefit of the network. 
These are examples of what we have termed “bottom-up co-
optation” because the network co-opts the member holding 
public office into servicing the interest of the group. From the 
perspective of the public official, the pressure to engage in 
corrupt activities is tremendous not least because fulfilling 
the duties and obligations vis-à-vis the network is closely 
linked to social status. 
Thus, according to research participants in focus group 
discussions in Kampala and Dar es Salaam, the corrupt 
individual who delivers to his or her group becomes “ 
rich and thus admired”, “popular and respected” or “a 
patron”. Conversely, focus group participants reflected 
on the consequences for individuals refusing to engage 
in corruption in terms such as: “you will be shamed and 
disrespected”, “you will be hated by associates”, “you may 
be killed”, “people around you will make you fail”.
This social acceptability of behaviours that would legally 
classify as corrupt is linked to locally held understandings that 
actions benefitting “one’s own people” are inherently just. 
In this sense, the research reveals how the determination of 
what is socially correct versus what is formally reprehensible 
is articulated in a continual and fluid evaluation of the 
particular circumstances surrounding each act rather than 
on rigid standards of ethical behavior stemming from a clear 
distinction between the public and private realms. 
This latter point is well illustrated in the distinction that 
research participants in Tanzania and Uganda make between 
bribing and corruption. A bribe is generally understood 
as instrumental and deliberate; it is a way to get what 
people need and it is used pragmatically. Corruption, on 
the other hand, is understood to refer strictly to what we 
conventionally associate with grand corruption, involving 
large amounts of money and usually perpetrated by high 
level officials and influential individuals. Overall, tolerance 
towards bribing is considerably higher than it is towards acts 
of corruption because bribing is simply viewed as one of the 
many strategies that ordinary citizens are forced to resort 
to in order to solve the problems they are confronted with, 
from the life threatening (e.g. obtaining emergency medical 
treatment) to the ordinary (e.g. processing a drivers’ license). 
Conversely, corruption is seen as stemming more directly 
from greed, an intrinsically individualistic act involving an 
abusive predisposition on the part of those who engage in it.
Thus, although among respondents in Kampala and Dar es 
Salaam bribing is for the most part pragmatically accepted, 
there are nonetheless unwritten rules that determine 
whether any particular act is deemed tolerable or not. 
Research participants agree that bribing should not be 
“excessive” and should not be extorted out of a desperate 
situation. Rather, bribing is often understood in terms of a 
broader social context in which individuals share a common 
understanding of each other’s circumstances. Consequently, 
each transaction involves some measure of calculation. 
For instance, public service users often take into account 
the fact that service providers are most of the time paid 
low salaries and overworked. Such considerations mean 
that bribing can be seen as a win-win situation for both 
parties, whereby the user can solve a problem (perhaps 
avoiding a significant fine) and the service provider gets 
some help in making ends meet. The instrumentality of 
bribing is shown in that users may even recommend service 
providers who solicit bribes “reasonably” to their friends 
and acquaintances. 
As mentioned before, whether a certain act, such as 
embezzlement of public funds, is tolerated or condemned 
depends on how the circumstances surrounding it are judged 
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and by whom. Overall, the insights shared by the research 
participants suggest one same corrupt action will be 
accepted when it is meant to benefit the perpetrator’s group 
and condemned when they are perceived to stem out of 
individual greed. Attitudes towards corruption are therefore 
infused with normative ambivalence or a pervasiveness 
of double standards, whereby one set of standards may 
apply to one’s group and another set of standards to others 
(Ledeneva, 2017; Passas, 1997). 
In sum, the research findings illuminate how social 
interactions based on deeply held values, such as reciprocity 
and solidarity, can be conducive to the social acceptability 
of corruption. Also notable is the underlying judgment about 
the fairness of each act, which is independent of whether 
the act contravenes or upholds the law. Thus, the gap 
between the formal and the informal is sustained on strong 
value laden beliefs where most research participants view 
the enforcement of the law as penalizing people whereas 
“bending” the laws is justified when it is done in order to 
help others, redress grievances and fulfil unmet needs. 
Acting with integrity is in these contexts not understood in 
terms of upholding the duties of public office or acting for 
an abstract public good, but rather caring after the particular 
interests of one’s informal networks. 
2.3 What can we learn from the 
success stories?
Georgia and Rwanda are success stories in the fight 
against corruption and in our research we have sought to 
understand the factors associated with their success from 
the perspective of what we have learned about the informal 
practices that drive corruption in the challenging cases. 
Both countries have implemented radical reforms of the public 
sector. The reform packages involved, among other things, 
a drastic reconfiguration of their bureaucracies, dismantling 
existing discredited institutions and replacing them with 
new ones based on principles of leaner bureaucracies and 
administrative simplification. The specific elements of the 
reforms in Georgia and Rwanda have been extensively 
described elsewhere (e.g. World Bank 2012, Hausman 
2014) but overall they included many of the approaches and 
tools of public sector reform associated with internationally 
recognised best practices (World Bank and Webb 2008). 
In the findings, two dimensions of the public sector reform 
effort stand out. The first has been a stringent enforcement of 
the new rules based upon effective monitoring mechanisms 
and little to no tolerance to deviations, which has dramatically 
decreased the opportunity space to engage in the informal 
practices associated to corruption. Secondly, there has 
been a notable improvement in the ease of access to 
and quality of public services which, from the bottom up 
perspective, renders the resort to instrumental practices of 
bribing unnecessary and does away with the need to rely 
on informal networks. 
Naturally the question arises about how the political will to 
implement far-reaching reforms comes about and why it 
appears to be absent in the challenging cases. The evidence 
suggests that the answer has to do with the nature of 
the leadership. Albeit stemming from radically different 
circumstances – the democratic election of the Georgian 
United National Movement in 2003 triggered by the events of 
the Rose Revolution and the military victory of the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front that put an end to the genocide in 1994 – in 
both countries a new leadership came to power that enjoyed 
autonomy from informal ties and obligations to the networks 
associated with the previous regimes and was backed by 
an overwhelming popular mandate. This seems to be key 
since the evidence from the challenging cases suggest that 
radical reforms are extremely difficult (if not impossible) to 
undertake when the leaders depend for political support on 
extensive clientelistic and patronage relationships, which in 
turn depend on the availability of a large number of public 
sector positions and resources.
Rwanda further offers important lessons that demonstrate 
how anti-corruption can be tailored to specific contexts. In 
particular, a central feature of the Rwandan anti-corruption 
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crusade relates to a deliberate effort to close the gap 
between informal norms and the formal legal framework. 
Two modalities are observable by means of which better 
alignment between the formal and the informal have been 
pursued.
The first modality involves “formalising the informal” or, 
perhaps even better, “respecting and drawing on the informal” 
or developing formal policies that are closer to social norms 
and practices to which ordinary citizens easily relate. This is 
best illustrated with reference to the so-called home grown 
initiatives, which are policies and government initiatives that 
appeal to traditional Rwandan social norms and values. An 
illustrative example of these home grown initiatives, which 
has been effective in controlling corrupt behaviours in the 
public sector, is the imihigo or performance contracts that 
are signed by every public official (and now even by heads 
of households) whereby they commit to achieving a set of 
performance goals associated with government development 
programs, to which they are later on held accountable. 
The origin of the imihigo in Rwandan traditional culture 
refers to a commitment of bravery, patriotism and service 
to the community that would go as far as to require the 
sacrifice of one’s life if so required. In the case of high level 
functionaries at both the local and national government 
levels, the performance contracts are signed directly with the 
President. Furthermore, the bi-annual evaluation meetings 
are chaired by the President and strongly echo the traditional 
guhigura imirimo or kwivuga ibiwi public “praise ceremonies” 
where successful contenders were publically eulogized for 
their bravery before the community leaders. Nowadays, 
the performance evaluation process receives extensive 
coverage across the country and while the best performers 
are rewarded, the research suggest that failure to meet 
one’s targets is considered to be an immense dishonour 
that brings shame not only to the individual but also to his 
or her family and community. 
The second modality involves emphasising education 
and awareness raising activities that seek to promote 
expectations, values and mental models consistent with the 
rejection of corrupt behaviours. In this sense, the Rwandan 
regime has given strong emphasis to the promotion of integrity 
as a value associated to the national identity, which appears 
to be effective in cultivating socially accepted values closer 
to those of the rule of law and good governance paradigm. 
Of particular relevance are training programs such as Itorero, 
which in the history of Rwanda was the school of excellence 
for Rwandan youth who were trained at the King’s palace 
on moral and intellectual skills as well as military training 
to develop virtues of courage, patriotism, endurance, and 
public responsibility. The Itorero Civic Education Program 
was reintroduced in 2007 and consists of instruction on 
Rwandan history that emphasizes traditional cultural values 
that translate into strong commitment to public service and 
good governance in the contemporary setting. Notably, 
our research suggests that attending Itotero has become a 
source of social status among Rwandans whereby alumni 
are looked up to and respected in their communities. 
The effectiveness of these measures to counter corruption 
top-down is reflected in our findings from the research 
at the grassroots level in Rwanda where it is recognized 
that it is extremely difficult to get away with bribing and 
that the penalties that can be expected if caught are very 
harsh for both the receiver and the giver. In the focus 
group discussions in the urban area (Kigali) participants 
gave numerous examples of people they know who ended 
in prison for paying a bribe even if the amount involved was 
small. In Rwanda it is simply assumed that in the current 
context one cannot get away with behaving corruptly.
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On the face of emerging evidence about contextual drivers 
of corruption, what can be said about the shortcomings of 
conventional anti-corruption approaches?
The evidence supports the notion that in the challenging 
countries the problem of widespread corruption is best 
characterised as a collective action problem, where the 
absence of a “principled principal” that has the incentives to 
forcefully pursue an anti-corruption agenda is conspicuous 
(Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013). However, rather 
than attributing the collective action dilemma to shared 
expectations that everyone else behaves corruptly, evidence 
from the challenging cases suggests that what lies beneath 
are complex systems comprised of interwoven informal 
political and social networks that operate away from formal 
settings. The roots of corruption lie in the informal strategies 
by means of which political elites, business interests and 
social actors acquire power and resources. When those 
informal strategies are effective, they become entrenched, 
acquiring systemic dimensions. In such contexts, anti-
corruption approaches that treat corruption as exceptional 
- as opposed to generalized - behaviour will, not surprisingly, 
have limited success. 
From the arguments above it follows that a major challenge 
to the effectiveness of mainstream anti-corruption technical 
assistance is that it does not take into account the evidence 
that corruption is widespread and embedded because it is 
functional. It helps win elections, reward supporters, control 
opponents and gain access to resources. At the political 
level, where practices of co-optation, control and camouflage 
are used instrumentally to stay in power and ensure the 
stability of authoritarian regimes, the top leaders themselves 
become hostages of the particularistic interests on whose 
support they rely. Such cases depend on corruption for 
legitimation and ultimately for survival. In turn, average 
citizens, who indeed suffer the consequences of corruption, 
are not necessarily innate advocates of anti-corruption but 
rather may go to great lengths to bypass if not outright 
break the law (Passas, 1990, 2000, 2010). The evidence 
from East Africa highlights how unmet needs are a powerful 
force behind the tolerance to corrupt practices because it 
reveals that bribes and networks serve similar functions: 
they are tools to “get things done”. 
Thus, it seems an inescapable conclusion is that more 
effective anti-corruption strategies will need to address 
the functionality of corrupt practices from the perspective of 
those who engage in them. The Rwandan case is an example 
of how an improved provision of public services contributes 
to render bribing and use of informal influences unnecessary. 
The Georgian case suggests that democratic competition 
can bring to power a new independent leadership capable 
of assuming the role of a principled principal and enforcing 
radical reforms.
The functional relevance of informal practices also points 
to the problems with the tendency to address corruption by 
means of adopting tougher formal laws. An adequate legal 
framework is, of course, essential and necessary, but laws 
must also be supplemented with other approaches that 
address the root causes of corruption. Too many lawyers and 
bureaucracy in the design and implementation of governance 
reforms result in symbolic legal mechanisms that have little 
impact on the incidence as well as perception of corruption. 
Furthermore, a purely legalistic approach generates 
certain risks. In both government and the private sector, 
misalignment of legal practice and ethical norms results 
in mere-law-based compliance and “lawful but awful” 
practices (Passas, 2005). Furthermore, the “regulatory 
tsunami” facing governments around the world, which are 
tasked with implementing multiple international conventions, 
generates intense legislative and regulatory activity that risks 
generating excessive red tape, and regulatory complexity 
as well as normative ambiguity, which generate incentives 
for circumvention of rules and corrupt practices (Claro 
and Passas, 2013). Indeed convoluted legal frameworks 
provide an ideal ground for camouflaging corrupt dealings 
(Baez Camargo and Ledeneva, 2017), which means that not 
carefully crafted legal reforms may ironically undermine anti-
corruption objectives as well as overall governance, rule of 
law and legitimacy. 
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It is unquestionable that anti-corruption measures can be 
externally induced, through the adoption of international 
conventions, the actions of international and bilateral 
organizations, and as reactions triggered by corruption 
perception indices or hastily adopted metrics. While to a 
large extent governments may pursue anti-corruption efforts 
out of a genuine belief in the rule of law, it should also 
be recognized that reforms can also be passed merely to 
appease international donors and investors, as an instrument 
of legitimization vis-à-vis external and internal audiences or 
as a weapon against political opponents. In such contexts 
anti-corruption in the form of technical assistance to law 
enforcement agencies risks making the camouflage façade 
thicker by providing proof of a commitment to anti-corruption 
that may not be entirely genuine. 
There are problems as well with conventional protocols for 
the implementation of development assistance programmes. 
Informal governance systems cannot be addressed when the 
tasks and functions of anti-corruption work are conceived in 
a fragmented manner, as they often are, which in addition 
leads to an inefficient use of resources and thereby generate 
malfunctions (e.g. overlap of mandates conducive to 
turf wars, duplication of work and interferences). In this 
sense, linear approaches to implementing development 
programming that emphasize predefined outputs and results 
frameworks are increasingly recognized as problematic 
especially for anti-corruption programmes that operate in 
complex, politically sensitive and continuously changing 
environments (Adam Smith International 2016). Focus 
on interim goals and targets that different organizations 
“must meet” by internal or sponsor arrangements are sadly 
conducive to missing the ultimate goals of anti-corruption: 
culture of integrity, less corruption, better governance, 
services, quality of life, security, rule of law, sustainable 
economic growth/development and happiness in society. 
A narrow focus on specific projects and interim metrics 
risks losing sight of problematic activities (which are either 
taken for granted or as dismissed as “natural” and inevitable) 
preventing us from constructing widespread dysfunctions 
as social problems that must be documented, discussed 
and addressed collectively. 
Finally, the need to contextualise is recognized on paper 
but is seldom reflected in “off the shelf” policies. This does 
not apply only to the case study countries from which the 
arguments in this paper are derived but to many others as 
witnessed by the cases of Afghanistan, Somalia and Greece 
(to name a few), which provide examples where resources 
have been wasted implementing costly changes that have 
failed to yield results (according to a recent report, the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan has cost more than the total 
post-war European reconstruction8).
These problems lie at the heart of the legitimacy and legality 
gap (Passas, 2005; Passas and Goodwin, 2004), a gap 
between what is right, ethical and acceptable on the one 
hand, and what is mandated by the law. This gap will never 
be bridged by an insistence on doing things in the same 
way as before, insisting on “solutions” that do not work, 
pretending that we can get better results in the future, 
creating unreasonable expectations and thus getting close to 
what might be termed “regulatory fundamentalism” (Passas, 
2006, 2015).
8 See: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/cost-afghanistan-reconstruc-
tion-dwarfs-post-wwii-marshall-plan-1459349.
3. What have we been doing 
wrong?
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The evidence suggests that high levels of corruption are 
associated to a significant discrepancy between formal rules 
and informal practices. However, efforts to address such 
gap by passing additional laws not only do not work, but 
may actually compel the problem by incrementally pitting 
the formal and informal against each other. In fact, as the 
success cases imply, simplifying processes and rules is key 
since complex legal frameworks can better accommodate 
the camouflage of illegal actions. Furthermore, formal laws 
and policies can be drafted in a manner that they appeal to 
the prevailing social norms and values of the population and 
the educational sector has a critical role to play in supporting 
the development of a culture of integrity.
We conclude this paper by suggesting that anti-corruption 
practitioners might want to re-think the role of informality 
and consider how it may actually help us. The prevalence 
and entrenched nature of informal practices indicate their 
heuristic potential: they can tell us what we are missing 
in official policies, inform about resistances and can help 
uncover pathways to strategic, sustainable reforms.  Thus, 
we need to be concerned with making the invisible visible by 
understanding the logic that underpins the workings of the 
informal regimes as a first step on the road to strengthening 
our ability to support better development outcomes. 
A nuanced understanding of the political economy of 
corruption will help practitioners to recognise that in the 
“challenging” cases we are confronted with complicated 
systems comprising powerful and tightly interwoven 
interests, which calls for an evidence-based, systematic 
and collective response. A step in the right direction will be 
moving away from fragmented approaches and constructing 
multi-stakeholder coalitions capable of engaging in collective 
action on the basis of a long-term strategic approach.
4. Towards a new generation 
of anti-corruption strategies
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Abstract
In many countries high levels of corruption persist in spite of the adoption of so-called anti-cor-
ruption “best practices”. In this paper we make a call to pursue a context-sensitive inquiry 
into the drivers of corruption in order to substantially improve the practices and effects of an-
ti-corruption. We discuss evidence from case studies in Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus 
suggesting that high levels of corruption are associated to a significant discrepancy between 
formal rules and informal practices. Informal practices of co-optation, control and camouflage 
are used by political and business elites to safeguard regime survival via a de facto re-distri-
bution of public resources in favour of informal networks of “insiders”. From the perspective 
of citizens, corrupt acts such as bribing enjoy social acceptability especially when they are 
effective in solving practical problems and protecting livelihoods. The functional relevance 
of informal practices clarifies the factors behind the limited effectiveness of anti-corruption 
law-driven reforms, short-term action plans, and technical measures that focus on particu-
lar processes, procedures and institutions. We argue for the need to ponder informality and 
consider how it may help us develop better anti-corruption strategies. The prevalence and en-
trenched nature of informal practices indicate their heuristic potential: they can tell us what 
we are missing in official policies, inform about resistances and can help uncover pathways 
to strategic, sustainable reforms.
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